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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone is familiar with the tale of the elephant and the three 
blind men,1 each of whom felt a separate part of the animal, and 
each of whom therefore came to wildly differing conclusions on the 
fundamental nature of elephants.  Less familiar is a corollary tale.  In 
a certain kingdom was a cave containing a treasure, guarded by a 
beast of fierce repute.  The king wished to know the nature of the 
beast, and dispatched three of his subjects to invade the pitch 
darkness of the cave and report.  The first returned and declared 
that he had felt the head of the beast, and it was toothed and maned 
like a lion.  The second reported that he had felt the sides of the 
beast, and that it was winged and feathered like an eagle.  The third 
reported that the legs of the beast were long and hoofed like a horse.  
A fearsome portrait of the beast was drawn up, and all were 
thereafter afraid to approach the cave.  Of course, in reality, the cave 
contained a lion, an eagle, and a horse. 
I have felt for some time that the notion of expertise as 
currently approached is in much the same position as the idea of 
judicial notice before Kenneth Culp Davis.2  There are more beasts in 
 
 * Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  B.A., Yale University; 
J.D. Harvard Law School.  An earlier version of this essay appeared in Volume 
Three of MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
(West 1999) by David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, and Joseph 
Sanders. Material from that version is used with permission. 
 1 While the fable tells of six blind men, three will suffice for my purposes.  For 
a telling of the original see John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in 
THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE 111 (1892). 
 2 See, e.g.,  Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945 (1955); 
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).  Davis examined contexts where casual use of 
“judicial notice” as an umbrella term by courts obscured important functional 
subcategories.  It is almost unnecessary to observe that these works have been very 
influential. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee note. 
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that cave than we have come to understand, and we have handled 
them poorly by applying rules to each beast that are appropriate 
only to the proper handling of another.  We cannot really develop a 
system of satisfactory principles of control until we gain a better 
idea of how many beasts are in the cave, and how they are similar to 
and different from each other.  This essay hopes to begin that quest. 
Another, less allegorical, way of saying this is that many of the 
problems that the law has had in handling expertise in the 
courtroom have sprung from a failure to examine the concept of 
expertise in appropriate taxonomic detail.  Witnesses perform many 
functions which might be described as expert witness functions.  
There has been surprisingly little effort to examine this variety of 
functions in any organized way.3  The only classification commonly 
attempted is to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific 
expertise, and that attempt has not been wholly coherent or 
successful.4 
 
 3 Perhaps Professor Wigmore bears some responsibility for this.  He was 
clearly a believer in the maxim, cuicunque in arte sua perito credendum est (“every 
man is to be trusted in his own art”), and was quite willing to accept fairly 
uncritically most claims of expertise by apparently respectable people.  D. Michael 
Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for 
Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 731, 767-69 n.172 (1989).  He further believed that any doubtful cases would be 
dependably disposed of properly by the average judge in the exercise of a 
discretion he thought should be unreviewable.  2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE 
ON EVIDENCE § 561 (3d ed. 1940).  Wigmore treats “expertise” (a term which he 
himself avoided, without explanation, in the text of his great treatise) as a 
subheading in the general discussion of the requirement that all witnesses have 
“experiential capacity” which he defined as “the skill to acquire accurate 
conceptions.”  Id. § 555, at 749.  This he further breaks down into two types: that 
possessed by “every person of ordinary fortunes in life” and that “special and 
peculiar experience.”  Id.  He then asserts that this “special and peculiar 
experience” can be derived from two sources or a combination thereof: 
“occupational experience” and “systematic training,” which he generally terms 
“scientific experience.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Beyond this he simply does not 
go, saying only that “the question in each instance is whether the particular witness 
is fitted as to the matter at hand.”  Id.  The latter phrase is in some ways an ironic 
prefiguration of the holding in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), ironic 
because Kumho Tire prescribes extensive particularized reliability analysis and 
Wigmore prescribed virtually none.  See generally D. Michael Risinger, Defining the 
“Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science after Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”].  
Some cogent observations on varieties of expertise may be found in John William 
Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by 
Restrictions of Function, Reliability and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349 (1992). 
 4 Some attempt to distinguish between “scientific” and “nonscientific” 
expertise became necessary with the rise of the “Frye test” for the admissibility of 
novel scientific evidence, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and of 
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At the outset, we must keep clearly in mind that expertise, 
whatever it is, is important in the courtroom only as it is manifested 
in particular testimony.  While a witness may in common parlance 
be declared an “expert,” this does not render everything the witness 
utters from the witness stand a product of expertise.  Any specific 
statement by the witness may be no more than “fact” testimony, 
which might be given by any human who had perceived the 
conditions being testified to.  In addition, two different assertions by 
a single “expert” witness may manifest different functional 
categories of expert testimony, while a third may be beyond the 
expert competence of the particular witness for any number of 
reasons.5  While a variety of expert competencies may inhere in the 
mind of a given witness, they are only made functionally available 
through particular testimonial assertions.  Any taxonomy must 
therefore concentrate on examining the function of specific kinds of 
testimonial assertions claimed to reflect expertise.  Only then can the 
problem of what ought to establish witness competency to perform 
a particular function be helpfully addressed. 
I.  NON-EXPERT TESTIMONY—THE FACT WITNESS FUNCTION 
To begin our examination of expertise, we may profitably 
examine what is generally conceded not to involve expertise: the 
“fact witness” function.  When one human takes the witness stand 
and testifies to another group of humans in the jury box concerning 
his or her particular perceptions in the past which are relevant to 
some material fact issue under the substantive law applicable to the 
case, that person is performing the fact witness function.  We 
 
course has come even more to the fore as the result of the decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Professor Imwinkelried 
perceptively noted early on that the real problem might be fashioning 
dependability criteria for nonscientific expertise, but without any detailed analysis 
of its characteristics.  See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step after 
Daubert: Developing a Similar Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of 
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271 (1994).  Much recent 
scholarship attempts to contrast scientific expertise with expertise based largely on 
experience.  The contrast is generally drawn in ways that are less than satisfactory 
both analytically, see note 22 infra, and in regard to recommended tests of 
admissibility, which often have little to do with the actual reliability of asserted 
“experiential” expertise.  Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand,” supra note 2, at 
nn.14-15. 
 5 This circumstance also makes the practical control of expert witnesses 
sometimes quite difficult, as each individual sentence may shift with the facility of 
Proteus from a statement within the scope of both an acceptable expertise (and one 
actually possessed by the witness) to a statement beyond the witness’s capacities or 
indeed the bounds of any existing expertise. 
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assume that the only general difference between the witness and a 
juror is not a difference in the capacity to process and derive 
meaning from information, but merely a space-time difference: the 
witness was someplace the juror was not, and therefore perceived 
things directly that the juror could not perceive because the juror 
was not there.  It is the fact witness function to recount perceptions 
as concretely as is practical.  It is the function of the jury to evaluate 
the dependability and meaning of those asserted perceptions, when 
viewed with other available competing information. 
Fact testimony occurs whenever the only assumed advantage 
of the witness over the juror is this space-time advantage.  However, 
the addition of certain other advantages to the witness does not 
seem to change the nature of the testimony to something usefully 
called an exercise of expertise.  Suppose the witness can be proven 
to have abnormally keen hearing, so that her assertion that she 
heard some relevant conversation from a surprising distance moves 
from absurd to credible.  Now the witness has a basic perceptual 
capacity advantage over the juror, but that would not seem to make 
her testimony expert testimony in any sense either common or 
useful.  The testimony is still testimony that the juror can 
understand by reference to the juror’s own basic capacities of 
perception: “The witness heard the statement from fifty feet away in 
the same way I would have from five feet away.”  It seems expertise 
must involve something beyond this. 
II.  SUMMARIZATIONAL EXPERTISE—THE EXPERT AS EDUCATOR6 
The simplest variety of testimony commonly referred to as 
involving expertise appears functionally to be very close to ordinary 
fact testimony.  To illustrate, consider a case under the Uniform 
Commercial Code in which the proper construction of a contract 
turns on industry practice in the wholesale shoe business.  A witness 
is called who has been in the wholesale shoe business for thirty-five 
years.  He will universally be declared an expert, and his testimony 
will generally be characterized as “expert testimony.”  However, to 
 
 6 I have generally used the term “summarizational” to emphasize the 
information processing function of such testimony.  On the uncommon occasions 
when such testimony is explicitly dealt with in the literature, however, the 
witnesses are usually referred to as “educational” experts, and that is likely to 
remain the common term.  See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The 
Expert as Educator: Enhancing the Rationality of Verdicts in Child Sex Abuse 
Prosecutions, in 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 323 (1995); Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. 
Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 
1131 (1993). 
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the extent he merely recounts the contours of practice in the shoe 
industry as he knows them to be from his experience, how does his 
testimony differ from that of the ordinary fact witness?  He is not 
necessarily possessed of any relevant skills or talents beyond the 
members of the jury.  There is no reason to believe that if any of 
them had been where he has been and perceived what he has 
perceived, that they would not in the ordinary course know what he 
knows.  He seems to have nothing more than a space-time 
advantage over the jurors, no different than a fact witness. 
There is an important difference, however, in the desired 
testimonial function of the ordinary fact witness and that of the shoe 
man.  We want the ordinary fact witness to traffic in empirical 
specifics.  In addition, we want those specifics expressed in the most 
concrete fashion practicable.  When the fact witness begins to 
express herself in more inferential terms, summarizing a number of 
specific percepts with an umbrella inference such as the word 
“drunk” or the word “angry,” fights start to break out in the 
courtroom over the propriety of the terms in which the witness is 
testifying.  We need not tarry at length over the unhelpful terms in 
which those battles are often waged.7  Suffice it to say that the 
general principles which should guide the judge in controlling the 
manner of expression of fact witnesses are reasonably agreed upon: 
(1) No inferences beyond the capacity of the witness; (2) Even if 
inferentially conclusory testimony is within ordinary capacity to 
accurately render, require more concrete testimony and leave the 
inference to the jury unless; (a) the inference is based upon 
subliminal percepts not fairly reproduced in testimony: or (b) unless 
trying to explain to the witness what is desired will confuse the 
witness and result in a net loss of dependable relevant information.8 
In the case of the shoe man, such an approach would defeat the 
whole purpose of his testimony.  He is there to give precisely the 
kind of summary we would not want from the ordinary fact witness, 
 
 7 These fights generally are said to concern “lay opinion.”  See FED. R. EVID. 
701.  Few terms in the law of proof are so common and so indeterminate and 
unhelpful as the term “opinion.”  I have endeavored to use the term sparingly, and 
then only within explicit or implied quotation marks.  For one problematical case 
appearing to declare (almost) globally that investigating police officers may always 
testify conclusorily as lay witnesses about the point of impact at an automobile 
collision scene, even when they might appear to be able to reproduce concretely all 
the information which went into such conclusion, see State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 
553 A.2d 335 (1989). 
 8 See generally MICHAEL H. GRAHAM ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
6637 at 228-34 (1992). 
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in order to educate the jury about the practices of the shoe industry 
as efficiently as possible consistent with giving accurate 
information.  This summary is derived from a data base of many 
particular and concrete observations over a long period of time.  
Much of this is now beyond specific recall, but we assume that, as a 
person who remained long in business,9 his resultant impressions 
and conclusions are in general accurately weighted conclusions 
based on the totality of his experience.  If we were to require him to 
testify in more concrete terms, his testimony would become a series 
of anecdotes which would not necessarily represent a proper sample 
of his whole experience.10  We want him to perform what can 
profitably be labeled the “summarizational function,” and because 
ordinary fact witnesses are debarred from it, the price of admission 
for the shoe man is to label him something other than a fact witness.  
Traditionally, there is only one other label available, so he is 
declared an expert, which is taken to authorize the summarizational 
form of his testimony. 
To this point, our model of the summarizational expert has 
been our shoe man, and there has been an assumption that most or 
all of the knowledge which goes into his summary testimony is 
knowledge derived from his direct personal experience.  This may 
be the case in a given situation, and it is this direct personal 
experience summarizational expert function which is conceptually 
closest to the fact witness function.  But in reality, a real shoe man 
might derive much of his information about the workings of the 
industry from secondary sources, such as industry meetings, 
networks of friends, and so forth.  He may also have read industry 
publications of various sorts.  In this case the shoe man’s testimony 
will be a summary result not only of his direct personal experience, 
but of these secondary hearsay sources as well.  We could hardly do 
otherwise and allow him to testify at all, because he himself could 
not say with confidence which parts of his knowledge were based 
on personal experience and which on secondary information.  But 
we assume that his first-hand experience has enabled him in various 
ways to evaluate and internalize the secondary information, with 
 
 9 His ability to remain long in business in this competitive field is the main 
circumstance that warrants a belief in the general accuracy of his summary of the 
relevant contours and usages of the shoe business.  For a few further observations 
on the necessity of developing a legal theory of warrants, see infra note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
 10 Though of course we might properly allow him to illustrate a general point 
with an anecdote which he asserts is in fact typical. 
RISINGER FORMATTED.DOC 4/18/2001  10:37 AM 
514 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:508 
reasonable reliability inhering in the resultant summary.  Our 
tolerance for this hearsay element, and our reliance on the witness 
as filter of it, is a second way in which a summarizational expert 
differs from the ordinary fact witness. 
So far we have dealt with direct experience summarizational 
experts and direct and secondary experience summarizational 
experts.11  Do we allow summarizational experts whose testimony 
summarizes secondary sources exclusively?  We do, sometimes.  
Such persons are most commonly academics whose function is to 
educate the jury to the relevant results of academic research.  The 
belief is that so educating the jury may provide them with 
information to support conclusions about the other evidence in the 
case that one would not expect the jury to have derived from 
common experience, or indeed might even be counter-intuitive from 
common experience.  A good example would be the testimony of a 
cognitive psychologist such as Elizabeth Loftus on the weaknesses 
of eyewitness identification as shown by the published research in 
that area.12  Note that when such an expert testifies, she is not 
normally asked about her own evaluation of the accuracy of the 
 
 11 I am well aware that I am verging on the “autoptic proference” problem.  
When Wigmore was attempting to classify various offers of physical evidence, he 
labeled the offering of a physical object which was a relic of the event under 
investigation an “autoptic proference” (autoptic from a Greek word actually 
meaning “with his own eye,” emphasizing that the jury would actually be able to 
see the object rather than hear testimony concerning it,  and proference, a longer 
and less common synonym for “proffer”).  1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE § 24 (3d ed. 1940).  The concept was ill-defined, the words obscure and 
the phrase awkward and ugly.  Needless to say, it was not incorporated into the 
working vocabulary either of lawyers or scholars, and worse, became something of 
a joke, as the gleeful observations of the court in Morse v. State, 72 S.E. 534 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1911) demonstrate.  I have racked my brain for alternatives to such 
cumbersome phrases as “direct experience summarizational witness” and others in 
the text, but I have failed.  And since I believe each of these cleavages may bear 
importantly on the proper construction of dependability standards, I have done the 
best I could and then left them as they stand. 
 12 Loftus’s qualifications and activities in this regard are well known.  See, e.g., 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS,  EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Gary L. Wells, The Scientific 
Status of Research on Eyewitness Identification, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 11-2.0 (David. L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997 
& Supp. 2000) (discussing, inter alia, the contributions of Professor Loftus) 
[hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].  Some of her courtroom experiences are 
recounted in ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE (1991).  Of course, 
Loftus is not in fact always summarizing secondary sources alone, since she herself 
may have personally undertaken some of the relevant studies, but nevertheless, 
there may be cases where none of her personal studies are directly relevant, and 
only enter in as experiences qualifying here to summarize the relevant literature 
with sufficient accuracy. 
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identification in the case sub judice.  If she were, and if that were 
allowed, it would represent another expert function.  For now, we 
limit ourselves to a consideration of the summarizational function. 
Up to this point we have considered only witnesses who were 
in possession of all their relevant knowledge prior to any 
involvement in the litigation in which they are called to testify.  Do 
we allow summarizational witnesses to supplement their pre-
existing knowledge with new information which they seek out only 
for the purposes of giving testimony?  The answer to this would 
seem to be yes, although the dangers of such specially developed 
information seem obvious.  Notionally, the summarizational expert 
is not supposed to be involved in an adversarial exercise, but merely 
recounting knowledge for the side which it coincidentally helps in 
the litigation.  While there is nothing logically dictating that, for 
example, issue-directed research into the literature by an academic 
will be skewed in its results by identification with the side 
employing the expert, human beings might commonly be expected 
to so respond.  Suffice it to say for now that some summarizational 
experts testify to present knowledge specially acquired for the 
purposes of litigation. 
 
While a witness might undertake supplementary direct 
personal experience after involvement in litigation, the practicalities 
of arranging for such life experiences during the pendency of the 
litigation practically rule this out in many classes of cases.  
However, the long delays of modern litigation sometimes allow a 
technical witness to add to the corpus of research being summarized 
in ways specifically designed to meet the needs of the individual 
case, and this has become quite common in some areas such as 
obscenity and trademark infringement cases.13  In addition, while in 
theory a secondary source summarizational expert might acquire all 
secondary source information to be summarized after litigation 
 
 13 See generally the materials collected in chapter three of John Monahan and 
Laurens Walker, Social Science in Law: Cases and Materials (4th ed. 1998).  Courts are 
increasingly sensitive to the dangers of litigation-driven research, and whether 
research relied upon by an expert was “conducted independent of litigation” is one 
consideration in evaluating its dependability.  E.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) on remand from Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  See also 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 
12, § 28-1.3.5.  This caution is understandable in regard to tort causation issues, 
perhaps, but it must be kept in mind that empirical issues such as the likelihood of 
specific product confusion are unlikely to be addressed in any context except 
litigation. 
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begins, practical considerations rule out the employment of a person 
as an expert who is not at least partially qualified by education or 
experience to find and evaluate such information prior to their 
involvement in the litigation.14 
As a result of the foregoing, we can identify two sources of 
knowledge for summarizational expert testimony: direct personal 
experience and secondary source information.  In addition, we can 
identify two important time variables for when secondary source 
information might be acquired: pre involvement in the litigation and 
post involvement. 
A.  Everyday vs. Academic Summarization Expertise 
At this point it is necessary to expand on a distinction inchoate 
in the above discussion, the difference between the shoe man and 
Elizabeth Loftus.  The shoe man is summarizing the salient aspects 
of professional experiences which, even if not necessarily within the 
talents and inclinations of the average juror to accomplish, are 
certainly relatively easy to understand, and therefore to evaluate, in 
ways closely related to the evaluation of normal fact testimony.  
However, Professor Loftus is summarizing the net conclusions 
resulting from evaluation of many empirical studies by many 
researchers of varying competence.  Her testimony is in essence a 
social science literature review and requires not only much 
specialized learning, but in all likelihood, analytical and 
mathematical talents and skills greater than those of the average 
juror.  Her testimony is therefore more difficult for the average juror 
to evaluate dependably.  We may think of the shoe man and 
Professor Loftus as defining two poles on a continuum of ease of 
juror evaluation; however, as summarizational witnesses tend to 
cluster toward the ends of the continuum, we may profitably speak 
of “everyday” summarizational experts and “academic” or 
 
 14 An exception to this, which explicitly involves the summarizational function 
but does not necessarily involve anything comfortably called expertise, is the 
summarization of voluminous materials pursuant to such rules as Federal Rule of 
Evidence 1006.  Virtually every witness called to perform this function will have 
obtained the information summarized only after the controversy being tried has 
arisen.  Many such witnesses will require special skills, such as accounting skills, to 
produce the summary, and thus they will be exercising an expert function.  But 
other such witnesses may require no capacities beyond those assumed to be present 
in the ordinary juror, and their testimony is merely a way of sparing each juror the 
tedium of generating the information themselves.  It requires no special knowledge 
or skill to take voluminous phone records and count the number of times the 
defendant called a particular phone number, and to enter the total on a chart. 
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“technical” summarizational experts. 
I have no quarrel with labeling the everyday summarizational 
witness an expert, at least in part because the term, both in law and 
ordinary understanding, is so broad and so ill defined that it is 
difficult to criticize its application to almost anything beyond 
rendition of concrete percepts.  However, it should be recognized 
that such summarizational witnesses are the lowest order of 
expertise.  This is especially true when what is being summarized is 
experience and information of a type requiring little unusual 
learning to understand.  In the case of such an every-day 
summarizational expertise, it seems there is little the law ought to 
require beyond the facial relevance of their claimed experience.  The 
main danger with such a witness is only that once they have 
obtained the imprimatur of the label “expert,” they will be allowed 
to go beyond their summarizational competence, or that the low 
standards of scrutiny appropriate to them will be generalized to 
other, less appropriate, contexts.15 
Technical summarizational expertise presents more difficult 
problems of control.  Indeed, witnesses who frankly perform this 
 
 15 Sometimes allowing the everyday witness to go from summarization to 
specific conclusion (translation) is perfectly justified.  In the civil case involving our 
shoe man, it might be reasonable to conclude that he is better able than the jury, not 
only to give information about the workings of the industry, but also to accurately 
apply that information to the particular circumstances of the case at hand, and that 
the jury would be rationally aided in its own decision by hearing what he had to 
say, especially since they are likely to hear a contrary conclusion from an expert for 
the other side.  However, in a criminal trial, with liberty at stake, different 
standards of proof, and a different trial dynamic, it behooves the system to take 
greater precautions against the jury too easily surrendering responsibility for the 
conclusion by merely adopting the conclusory testimony of the witness.  This has 
been something of a problem in the case of law enforcement officers called to testify 
from their experience and study concerning the general way criminal schemes and 
enterprises operate, and/or the usual meaning of criminal slang and code words.  
Such “M.O./argot” witnesses are often investigators in the case being tried, which 
creates a significant problem of jury confusion, and their testimony may easily cross 
the line from generalized statements about behavior to conclusory statements about 
a particular instance (e.g., “users generally can’t afford to hold more than a few 
grams for personal use, so amounts above that are generally intended for sale” to 
“ounces are intended for sale” to “this was a sale amount”).  See, e.g., United States 
v. Bruck, 152 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding no error in permitting conclusory 
testimony of federal agent that based on “certain indicators,” a fire was deliberately 
set for economic reasons); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1183-84 (1st Cir. 
1993) (affirming district court’s decision to strike police officer’s particularized 
statements as to the structure and operation of a drug ring where officer could not 
specify source of his knowledge regarding drug ring at issue).  See generally D. 
Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty 
Being Left on the Dock, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 133-37 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability]. 
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function, and this function alone, are a relatively recent 
development,16 and have been met with some skepticism and 
resistance by courts, generally for all the wrong reasons.  Because 
these witnesses are frankly educational, and because they do not 
perform this function in the context of defending “opinions,” or 
conclusions about particular adjudicative facts in the case sub judice, 
courts have often been perplexed on whether such a novelty should 
be allowed at all.17 However, in theory, the jury-education function 
 
 16 See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use 
of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 483 (1987).  Walker and Monahan’s “Social 
Framework” facts are generally synonymous with what otherwise might be called 
“jury notice facts,” generalized notions about the way the world works usually 
derived from life experience, without which a jury could not reason from the 
formal evidence to conclusions about the more particularized “adjudicative facts,” 
properly so called.  John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395 (1985).  See also 
Strong, supra note 2, at 350-53.  Walker and Monahan would attempt to end-run 
any problems concerning the presentation of evidence about such facts through 
experts, by requiring that the judge present such “social-framework” facts to the 
jury by instruction after reviewing the relevant information, an approach which 
seems unworkable to me in all but the clearest and most recurrent contexts.  For an 
example of such an analysis, see State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112, 727 A.2d 457 (1999), 
where, after extensive discussion of the risks and benefits of such a course, it was 
found to be error to fail to give a cautionary instruction on the dangers of cross-
racial identification in the particular circumstances of that case, though it was not 
error to refuse to allow expert testimony. 
 17 See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 572 So. 2d 908, 911 (Fla. 1990) (criticizing the proposed 
expert’s intention to offer only “general comments” about eyewitness identification, 
rather than testifying about the “reliability of any specific witness”).  Decisions 
disallowing such testimony are often based, not on the dependability of the 
testimony, but on its “usurping the function of the jury” or “not being helpful to the 
jury,” as if what we mean by due process of law is the right to be tried by twelve 
ordinary people who not only believe some important “major premise” general 
social facts which are contrary to the implications of substantial research, but who 
are required to be kept ignorant of that research, at least unless it is presented by 
someone who is willing to go beyond the bounds of their expertise and hazard an 
opinion about the particular details of the individual case.  For more on the 
“usurpation” argument, see generally the materials on Florida v. Zamora, set out in 
John Monahan and Laurens Walker, Social Science in Law: Cases and Materials (4th 
ed. 1998), at pages 485-94.  Also, compare United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675 
(11th Cir. 1992) (adopting per se rejection of such testimony), with United States v. 
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999) (admitting such evidence).  In addition, see 
Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112, 727 A.2d 457 (1999), where the court held it error not to have 
given a cautionary instruction on the dangers of cross-racial identification, but at 
the same time held that expert testimony on the same subject was not admissible 
because, as the result of a “‘widely held commonsense view that members of one 
race have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race’, 
expert testimony on this issue would not assist a jury.” Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 132, 727 
A.2d at 167-68 (quoting United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).  
Go figure.  See generally 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 11.1.1. 
General resistance to such “educational” testimony in the federal courts would 
be especially hard to account for, since the second paragraph of the Advisory 
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should actually be preferred to the “opinion” giving function, 
because it empowers the jury to draw their own conclusions more 
accurately instead of relying on the conclusions of others.  
Therefore, the frankly limited function of such a witness should be 
no impediment to testimony.  However, because such witnesses 
traffic in providing information—often unexpected or 
counterintuitive information—which is relevant to the jury’s 
ultimate fact reconstruction function, and moreover, because they 
claim to be summarizing valid, empirically based knowledge from 
an established discipline, it seems reasonable that the same 
standards of threshold control properly applicable to such 
testimony in the more traditional “opinion” function should be 
applied to such academic summarizational witnesses. 
B.  Translational Expertise 
At further remove from the fact witness is the “translational” 
expert, represented most clearly by the language translator.18 In 
order to understand what is going on in the case of such expertise, 
 
Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 generally embraces it.  However, 
it is important to note that judicial hostility to “educational” testimony is neither 
uniform nor even-handed, since prosecution “syndrome” witnesses are routinely 
allowed to testify on that basis.  Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 14, 
at 123.  This has prompted one commentator (me) to observe: 
Witnesses on the weaknesses of eyewitness identification are 
testifying to educate the jury on why the jurors’ everyday 
assumptions about the strengths and weaknesses of eyewitness 
identification may be wrong, and are generally testifying concerning 
the findings of a substantial body of controlled research including a 
large number of experimental studies.  Witnesses on the existence and 
characteristics of “syndromes” are offered to educate the jury on why 
their everyday assumptions on the strengths and weaknesses of sex 
crime complainants’ testimony  may be wrong, and they are generally 
testifying to the results of studies that are heavily rooted in anecdotal 
data and non-reproducible clinical judgments.  Yet the proffer by 
criminal defendants of the epistemically stronger “education” is often 
rejected, but the prosecution by the prosecution of the weaker 
“education” rarely, if ever, is rejected.  Something is wrong with this 
picture. 
Id. at 137 (footnotes omitted). 
 18 The fact that language translators are mentioned explicitly only in the general 
section on witnesses, Article 6 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (specifically Rule 
604), that procedurally they appear unusual because their testimony is interspersed 
with that of another witness, and that the term “expert” is not universally applied 
to them as a matter of routine, should not obscure the fact that they not only 
perform an expert function, but are in many ways the ideal example of the most 
central expert function: the translation function which lies behind most so-called 
expert “opinion.” 
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one must adjust one’s notion of relevance to take into account a 
common, but all-too-often overlooked, phenomenon: Sources of 
information can be brought before the trier-of-fact that undoubtedly 
contain information relevant to material issues in the case, but the 
information is encoded in the source in a way that we cannot 
assume it is intelligibly or usefully available to the average person 
on the jury.  Is such information relevant?  In one sense it is, but in 
the most important sense it is not.  Here we may profit by an 
analogy to the distinction between potential and kinetic energy.  It 
seems appropriate to say that the source being offered has potential 
relevance, but does not possess kinetic (or working or useable) 
relevance.19  Once the distinction is drawn, it is clear that the only 
kind of relevance which is of use to a rational fact finding process is 
such working or useable relevance.  Even when a source 
undoubtedly contains information of extremely important potential 
relevance, if that information cannot be rendered rationally 
available to the trier-of-fact, its potential relevance ought not to 
justify its presentation to the trier-of-fact. 
Suppose a woman of intelligence and perspicuity was standing 
on a street corner when a murder occurred in front of her.  She saw 
it, she heard it, and she can remember what she saw and heard.  
Unfortunately she speaks only Urdu.  She comes before the trier-of-
fact and, inferring what is desired of her, she tells in Urdu all that 
she remembers of the event.  The sounds in the air of the courtroom 
contain a great deal of precisely encoded information of great 
potential relevance to an accurate determination of the material facts 
of the case.  The sounds are potentially relevant.  However, we must 
assume that none of the jurors can speak Urdu. Thus they cannot 
derive accurately (or at all) the meaning encoded in the sounds.  
Without some mechanism to allow the jurors to reach a dependable 
conclusion about the information encoded in the sounds, it would 
seem to make little sense to allow the woman to testify.  What is 
needed is at least one person bilingual in both Urdu and English.  
Such a person knows a system whereby the meaning of the sounds 
in the courtroom may be dependably converted to a form 
understandable by the jury. 
There are two ways such a person might put the jurors in a 
position to understand the message encoded in the sounds in the 
courtroom: She could translate directly, or she could teach the jurors 
 
 19 This notion is explored at length in D. Michael Risinger, Johnny Lynn Old 
Chief, John Henry Wigmore and “Legitimate Moral Force”: Keeping the Courtroom Safe for 
Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 431-40 (1998). 
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Urdu and allow them to translate for themselves.  As previously 
indicated, the latter course ought to be viewed as preferable, all 
things being equal.  Then the jurors would be in the same position 
relative to the evidence and to each other as they are in relation to 
evidence in English.  Of course, all things are rarely equal.  In the 
case of a language skill, it is obvious that the translational system 
cannot be taught to jurors within the time constraints of any process 
that must be time efficient enough for dispute resolution.  In 
addition, language is subject to a great range of inherent aptitudes, 
at least in adults, and even were time available, the newly taught 
language would be learned by jurors in wildly different degrees.  
Hence, in the case of a language translator, the expert will normally 
testify to the expert’s own inferences concerning the correspondence 
in meaning between the Urdu sounds and the English sounds.  That 
is, the expert will give her translation, and the potential system-
teaching, or educational, function will rarely play a role (such an 
educational function may emerge as much more important in other 
translational expert contexts, however, as the reasons for the 
“opinion” of the witness emerge on direct or cross examination). 
What should we call the translator’s direct translation 
testimony?  It is common to speak of experts testifying in terms of 
opinions.  Yet it sounds odd to refer to the language translator’s 
testimony as an “opinion” in any but the most general and 
unhelpful sense, a sense so broad that a fact witness’s testimony 
could be equally characterized as the fact witness’s “opinion.”  The 
language translator’s testimony viewed in this way looks very like 
fact testimony in some ways.  In a sense we all translate our 
perceptions into language.  However, the translator from Urdu to 
English is applying a translational system unknown to the jurors, 
and therein lies the expertise, whether its expression can 
constructively be called “opinion” or not.20 
The language translator is merely the most archetypal and 
easily understood model of the translational function.  There are a 
large variety of asserted translational systems and skills in the world 
which may be at least facially relevant in legal proceedings.  Indeed, 
the bulk of expert witnesses are called upon to perform some form 
of translational function, and such testimony is best examined and 
classified by the characteristics of the translation process involved in 
each.  First, however, it is necessary to consider the general 
 
 20 For a case that treats a language translator both ways, see United States v. 
Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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characteristics of what I have called a translational system. 
In its most general sense, a translational system exists when 
there is an assertion that A means or indicates B.  In this most 
general sense there is no necessary requirement that either A or B be 
factual.  Interpreting dreams or animal entrails to determine 
whether the gods love someone is a kind of translational system, in 
the general sense.  However, it is not the kind which the law allows 
into the courtroom (at least knowingly).  The kind of translational 
system which yields the sort of conclusions we might consider in 
litigation must normally21 traffic in facts both as raw material and as 
results.  Generally, there is some sort of taxonomic system which 
defines and organizes the factual conditions asserted to have 
meaning, and there is a set of process rules or principles which yield 
a resultant translation from the factual conditions found to exist.  
This resultant must also be factual.  Hereafter we will generally 
restrict our discussion to translational systems having these 
characteristics, either formally or by implication. 
The first great distinction in examining such translational 
systems is the distinction between subjective systems and objective 
systems.  Subjective translational systems depend in large part on 
human judgment calls.  In addition, such asserted translational 
systems may not be empirically available to any but the asserted 
translator, though in principle their results may be empirically 
checkable.  Subjective translational systems are “clinical,”22 
depending upon the experience and often the claimed inherent 
special talent of the practitioner for their accuracy.  Identification of 
wine by taste is perhaps the best example.23  Objective systems do 
not depend upon human judgment calls in their operation, and are 
empirically available to all, or at least a substantial proportion, of 
humans after appropriate study.  Note that this does not mean that 
such a system necessarily yields perfectly exact results.  What is 
 
 21 The “normally” is used here as a hedge against the observations made below 
concerning “normative” expertise.  See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
 22 To my mind, the word “clinical” is much more apposite than the terms 
“experiential” or “experience-based” for describing expertise of this sort, since even 
the hardest of scientific expertise is based on experience.  “Clinical” alerts one both 
to the kinds of experience, and the kinds of interpretive or “translational” claims, 
that are involved. 
 23 Other well-known images include Judge McKenna’s harbor pilots in United 
States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1028, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), Judge Guy’s 
beekeepers in Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1994), and 
Justice Breyer’s “perfume tester,” in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 
(1999). 
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usually derived from such a system is a probability statement, 
though sometimes the probability is so high that it is practically 
certain.  Blood group analysis translates the potentially relevant 
information of blood bearing on its source, such that exclusion of a 
source may be near perfect in probability terms, but establishment of 
a source may be merely somewhat more probable than not, or even 
less.  DNA analysis properly done may raise the probability of the 
establishment of source so high as to be more dependable than 
virtually any other information we count as “fact” in most aspects of 
life, including litigation.  Most highly objective translational systems 
are also highly instrumented, that is, they depend on instruments of 
various kinds to perform the perception and classification of the 
stimulus data and the translation of the data into its non-obvious 
meanings.24 
Pure objectivity and pure subjectivity of translational systems 
are polar extremes on a continuum.  In the real world many asserted 
systems have elements of both, though one or the other is often so 
predominant that appropriate classification can be made on that 
basis, as long as the implications of the other element are kept firmly 
in mind.  For the present, we will begin by examining subjective, or 
largely clinical, translational systems. 
Subjective translational systems range from personal to highly 
normed25 group systems.  In personal systems the only guarantee of 
dependability is “black-box” testing of the individual translator.  In 
highly normed group systems, black-box testing of a sample of the 
 
 24 Notice that little has been said in the text about the concept of “science.”  This 
is not because I believe the notion of science is irrelevant to the taxonomy of 
expertise, or because I have no notions concerning its proper parameters.  See D. 
Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael J. Saks, Brave New Post-Daubert 
World: A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 433-40 (1998) 
[hereinafter Risinger, et al., Post-Daubert World].  However, this essay deals with 
ideas which cut across the science/non-science border (although any “scientific” 
enterprise aspires to well-defined and objective or highly normed translational 
systems), and in addition, it is here an advantage to clear exposition not to get 
involved in the “science/non-science” debate. 
 25 In this article the word “norm” appears in two different contexts, with two 
different meanings—an unfortunate byproduct of combining observations 
concerning two different contexts in which the word is used.  At this point the 
word “norm” is used as a verb to indicate the process of inducing predictability of 
agreement, or reduction in predicted disagreement, between two persons making 
the same clinical judgment about the same phenomenon.  The process of “norming” 
is attempted in many contexts, from clinical medicine to getting graduate assistants 
to respond to an essay with the same grade.  It is tied therefore to the notion of 
“reliability” in testing theory, which denotes consistency of result, not necessarily 
accuracy of result. 
RISINGER FORMATTED.DOC 4/18/2001  10:37 AM 
524 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:508 
group may suffice, when coupled with sufficient evidence of the 
success of the norming process.  Therein lies the rub. 
The hallmark of a purely personal subjective translational 
system is the assertion that a person can observe a stimulus, and 
that the stimulus assertedly means something, but the translator 
cannot describe how the conclusion of meaning is reached, and 
cannot demonstrate that the same translational system is shared 
with anyone else, even if others claim to have the same skill.  Water 
dowsing might be an example.  In principle, we might devise 
proficiency tests for the asserted skill which would have to be 
administered to each practitioner to determine if the asserted skill 
was in fact present for that person.  In practice, we seem to be so 
skeptical of any such purely personal claims that most traffickers in 
subjective translation claim to be members of a group of 
practitioners who share a common and therefore more or less 
teachable and learnable approach. The desirable endpoint of such a 
process would be a group of people who had: (1) a sufficiently 
empirically unmistakable common taxonomy that they would 
always perceive and classify in the same way the stimulus to be 
translated; and (2) a set of translational rules that they would be able 
to define and would always agree on, and which would yield results 
which were definite.  This would result in a perfectly normed group 
translational system.  Were such an endpoint actually achieved, it 
would be questionable whether the result would  properly be 
referred to as a subjective process.  The human agent would have 
become as dependable and understandable as a thermometer is in 
translating heat energy to a visual and quantified analogue.  In 
practice, of course, this is rarely approached very closely, and how 
far away from this ideal a system falls is a good indicator of its 
general likely dependability. 
As already noted, most translational expertise offered for 
admission in court is assertedly the product of a normed group 
translational process.  This is true whether or not the process claims 
(rightly or wrongly) to be “scientific,” as virtually all sciences 
relevant to legal issues retain an identifiable element of subjective 
judgment somewhere in their application to the circumstances of a 
particular case, to a greater or lesser degree. 
Most normed group subjective translational systems, whether 
they claim to be scientific or not, are distinctly imperfect.  By this I 
do not mean simply that they fail to generate translated meaning of 
perfect accuracy, but that they are systemically imperfect in a 
relatively small number of definable ways. The first problem 
RISINGER FORMATTED.DOC 4/18/2001  10:37 AM 
2000] FUNCTIONAL EXPERT TAXONOMY 525 
normally encountered is an imperfection in their underlying 
descriptive or taxonomic system, such that the categories in the 
system are not based on data empirically unmistakable by all 
properly trained (and therefore normed) practitioners.  Instead, 
individual classifications are the product of judgment calls by each 
individual practitioner, or worse, the resultant product of a number 
of such judgment calls weighed together by an unquantified and 
subjective combinative rule, a “weighing” or a “balancing,” with no 
empirically unmistakable weights available.  The success of the 
norming process at the descriptive level is measured by how much 
agreement there is among practitioners in giving the same 
classification to the same observed phenomenon.  High levels of 
agreement result in “reliable”26 taxonomies.  The less agreement 
among practitioners, the less reliable the system.  Three instructive 
examples might be drawn from the biological taxonomic system for 
animals, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM),27 and the criteria for sufficiency of comparable real property 
sales for valuation purposes.  The biological taxonomy tends to be 
highly (though not perfectly) reliable among properly trained and 
credentialed practitioners; The DSM less so, perhaps much less so in 
regard to some conditions.  Finally, as to land valuation, formal 
studies on taxonomic reliability do not exist, but anecdotally, it 
seems to be quite uncommon for two practitioners to agree on a 
common set of most comparable recent sales. 
It would be tempting to say that low taxonomic reliability 
 
 26 At some point someone took two everyday synonyms, “reliability” and 
“validity,” and turned them into terms of art in the area of measurement in science: 
“Reliability” refers to consistency of result (and might better have been called 
consistency, but it appears to be too late now), while “validity” refers to the actual 
output accuracy of a process. See generally 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra 
note 12, §§ 2.3, 3-2.1.1, & 3-2.1.2.  To make matters worse, in Daubert, the Court 
rather perversely (and intentionally) used the term “evidentiary reliability” to mean 
“scientific validity.”  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 
(1993).  This virtually guarantees confusion and miscommunication.  In this essay I 
have tried to use the terms “reliability” and “validity” in their technical sense, and 
when a broader term of legal standard seemed appropriate, I have used 
“dependability.”  However, in other writings, especially when dealing with the 
Daubert and Kumho Tire cases, I have partially caved in to the Supreme Court and 
used the terms reliability and dependability interchangeably.  See, e.g., Risinger, 
Defining the “Task at Hand”, supra note 3. 
 27 Published by the American Psychiatric Association and now in its fourth 
incarnation (or fifth, depending on how one counts an intermediate revision known 
as “III-R”) generally referred to as the “DSM-IV.”  Its problems are well known, if 
controversial.  See generally PAULA J. CAPLAN,  THEY SAY YOU’RE CRAZY (1995); 
STUART A. KIRK & HERB KUTCHINS, SELLING THE DSM: THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE IN 
PSYCHIATRY (1992). 
RISINGER FORMATTED.DOC 4/18/2001  10:37 AM 
526 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:508 
necessarily results in undependable and invalid translation, and that 
high reliability results in highly valid translation.  However, things 
are not quite so simple.  All low taxonomic reliability does is move 
the practitioner back to the status of an individual subjective 
translator.  Any given individual might be a good translator for 
reasons that defy definition, but it would take some sort of 
individually administered proficiency test to establish that.  Nor, as 
should be obvious, does the highly reliable norming of a taxonomy 
guarantee accurate translation.  Many astrology systems are both 
detailed and highly normed descriptively.28 
Which brings us to our next point of imperfection, the 
translational system itself.  A translational system is a system of 
formulas, rules, algorithms, or principles (or simply subjective 
responses) whose purpose and effect is to begin with the taxonomic 
data of a given situation and convert that to a statement concerning 
some other non-obvious, assertedly factual, state.  Like the 
underlying taxonomy, a translational system may be implicit, 
explicit, or partially explicit.  To the extent it is explicit, a 
translational system may be highly objective and determinate, 
utilizing quantifiable aspects of the data present and mathematically 
describable relationships, or it may be more subjective and 
indeterminate, ranging from attempts to formally describe and 
combine parameters of incommensurate factors through such tools 
as “fuzzy logic,”29 to the use of human beings as instruments to the 
same end.  In cases of the latter type, which are very common, the 
translational process reiterates the “more or less normed group” 
 
 28 Astrology is a subject matter which the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire held up 
as an archetype of asserted expertise which “lacks reliability.” 526 U.S. at 151.  At 
least one commentator has, (in passing, but with apparent seriousness), taken the 
Supreme Court to task for this exercise in judicial notice of legislative fact.  See 
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping in the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and 
the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 373 (1999).  However, the predictive 
validity of astrology is hardly a subject which has not been examined by the 
methods of normal science.  For example, Eysenck and Nias reviewed hundreds of 
studies of the accuracy of astrological predictions, and concluded that there is no 
replicated and statistically significant evidence that astrologers can predict the 
future.  HANS J. EYSENCK & DAVID K. B. NIAS, ASTROLOGY: SCIENCE OR SUPERSTITION? 
(1982). 
 29 The term “fuzzy logic” was coined by American computer scientist Lofti Zadeh, to 
describe “a type of logic used in computers and other electronic devices for processing 
imprecise or variable data; in place of the traditional binary values, fuzzy logic employs a 
range of values for greater flexibility.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 549 (3d ed. 
1988).  “Fuzzy logic deals in degrees of truth, instead of an absolute distinction between 
true and false.”  CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LINGUISTICS 140 (P.H. Matthews ed., 
1997); see also DANIEL MCNEILL & PAUL FREIBERGER, FUZZY LOGIC (1993). 
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problems already discussed in relation to taxonomies.  What I mean 
by this is that the translation is dependant on subjective judgments 
of unquantified and often incommensurate variables.30  The claim is 
usually that some process of common education results in the 
properly trained practitioner coming to more or less the same 
translation that any other properly trained practitioner would arrive 
at.  This claim is testable (though often not tested), and to the extent 
that testing reveals it to be true, the translational system may be said 
to be reliable.  If an asserted normed group translational expertise is 
not reliable, then once again, the only way to discover reliable (not 
yet to mention accurate) individual practitioners (if any) would be 
some regime of individual proficiency testing. 
Finally, reliability does not establish accuracy, but merely 
highly objective or highly normed agreement.  A highly normed 
group of numerologists might be very reliable in their predictions 
but yet be only randomly accurate.  An unreliable process cannot be 
accurate in any but a subset of cases, but a highly reliable process 
may be wrong most of the time in all cases. Thus, some reason to 
believe that a translational process is not only reliable but accurate is 
necessary before we should consider evidence based on it.31  This 
becomes a special problem in regard to any claimed expertise that 
does not have common, non-courtroom, real-world applications, 
coupled with unambiguous feedback in practice on the accuracy of 
conclusions.  Plumbers, auto mechanics and harbor pilots know if 
their judgments were correct in practice; on the other hand, clinical 
psychologists, or practitioners of purely forensic specialties (like 
handwriting identification, for example), often do not.32 
C.  Normative Expertise33 
At first blush this might seem an empty set, if we accept an 
unsophisticated version of the standard model of functions in the 
litigation system: Juries decide facts; the judge rules on the law; the 
value judgments appropriate to the outcome are reflected in the law.  
 
 30 That is, variables with no common system of comparative values. 
 31 How much and what kind of information might provide a warrant for the 
conclusion of sufficient dependability to be admitted in various circumstances is 
tentatively addressed infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 32 See D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: 
Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 33-34 (1996).  
See also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Assessment of Expertise: Transcending Construction, 
37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 301, 344-45 (1997). 
 33 The term “normative” is used here in the sense of something reflecting a 
value judgment.  See supra note 21. 
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Witnesses testify only to things relevant to the jury’s function.34  
Thus, no expert should be allowed to testify on issues of right or 
wrong, good or bad.  If a witness should happen to testify in such 
terms, it merely represents an isolated failure of control in a 
particular case. 
However, such a model hardly reflects the reality of practice, 
and hardly accounts for many common aspects of the jury function 
and the distribution of authority between the judge and jury.  In 
particular, it fails to recognize the official delegation of a normative, 
or value-judgment function to the jury in many contexts, often 
under the unhelpful (and inaccurate) label “mixed questions of law 
and fact” (which would better be called “mixed questions of fact 
and value”). 
As to many issues in many contexts, the law delegates to the 
jury as representatives of the community the authority to make 
particularized value judgments subject only to the most general 
constraining principles.  The jury becomes, in effect, a legislature for 
the particular case.  Some of these issues are terrifically common 
and centrally important.  Take for example, negligence.  Even if all 
the factual issues of a case are removed from doubt, even if we had 
a full sense hologram of the entire episode which gave rise to the 
controversy, coupled with a helmet which would allow us to follow 
the changing states of mind of all the actors from second to second, 
there would still be a critically important function for the jury: to say 
whether or not the behavior of the defendant was or was not 
“careful enough.” 
In general, we do not allow testimony by persons claiming to 
be experts on the normative aspects of such questions, at least 
explicitly.  The function of such an expert would be to say, “I have 
thought a lot about how much risk it is right for one person to 
impose upon another under such circumstances, and in my 
judgment, this defendant didn’t (or did) act properly.”  It is not that 
such arguments should never be heard by the jury.  On the contrary, 
one of the functions of counsel in closing is to make such arguments 
(though not in so personalized a manner).  Rather, it is that in 
general we recognize no one whose opinions on such matters is 
entitled to be considered more “expert” than anyone else’s, 
including most especially the jurors.  In general.  But there are 
sometimes exceptions. 
 
 34 For a good summary of the “standard model,” see WILLIAM TWINING, 
THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE  12-18 (1985). 
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Occasionally these anomalies are explicit: For decades some 
obscenity trials have featured the spectacle of “experts” being called 
on the issue of “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value” 
under the third prong of the test for obscenity created in Miller v. 
California.35  In these cases the jury is regularly treated to academics 
with literature credentials testifying to aesthetic merit or artistic 
worth.  The results have not necessarily been bad for the First 
Amendment, but they have been corrosive to the maintenance of 
any tenable categorical limitation excluding “normative experts.”  A 
similar circumstance obtains in regard to expert testimony on 
applicable conduct standards for professional malpractice in many 
jurisdictions—the danger arises when the witness strays from 
testifying about the empirical question of what professionals do to 
the normative question of what the witness should do. 
Examples of explicit authorization for normative expertise are 
uncommon.  Examples of normative expert testimony being given 
by witnesses called arguably for some other more factual function 
are not uncommon.  One familiar example is testimony by members 
of various psychological disciplines offered as relevant to insanity, 
diminished capacity, child custody, or similar issues.  For instance, it 
is widely accepted that the term “insane” as a legal term is a 
normative label dealing with responsibility and blameworthiness.  
Yet various practitioners of the psychological disciplines are 
regularly called to give expert testimony in regard to the issue of 
insanity. 
The normal account for this is that these disciplines can give 
factual knowledge which the jury would reasonably want to take 
into account in making the normative decision.  If it were an 
empirical fact, for example, that 999 out of 1,000 persons with one 
blue eye and one brown eye reported such an overwhelming drive 
to possess chocolate that they would seize it whenever it was 
physically within reach, that might arguably be something properly 
considered in determining the criminal responsibility of such a 
person charged with stealing chocolate.  While the exact relation 
between the “is” and the “ought” is by no means conclusively 
established, some connection is generally conceded ex necessitate, 
and providing accurate factual information to inform the normative 
judgment is not a violation of any prohibition on normative 
expertise. 
The problem with this position is twofold.  First, such experts 
 
 35 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
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are generally not very carefully restricted to this role.36  Second, on a 
more fundamental level, the entire enterprise of abnormal 
psychology and the “disease model” of abnormal behavior is 
profoundly normative at its root.  Albert Einstein and Jeffrey 
Dahmer were equally abnormal in an empirical or statistical sense, 
but only one is counted as having a “disease.”  “Disease” is a 
profoundly normative word, a circumstance which can be perhaps 
ignored in regard to physical conditions which cause death, pain or 
impairment of physical function, but which becomes more 
important to recognize in regard to behavioral categorizations. 
At any rate, all of this is well known, and it is not my intention 
to expand upon it sufficiently to do it the justice it would demand as 
a main topic of consideration.  Perhaps another day.  My purpose in 
raising it is to make the following point: Whatever justifications may 
exist for a relaxed threshold of admissibility concerning asserted 
expertise on issues where there is a normative component in the 
“factfinder’s” official function, it would be wrong to carry over any 
such casual attitude to elemental issues of concrete empirical fact, 
properly so called.  This would seem to be especially true when such 
expertise is offered by the prosecution in a criminal case, given the 
high standard of proof involved.  That is to say, to give one blunt 
example, forensic pathology ought properly to be held to higher 
standards of dependability than forensic psychology. Forensic 
psychology generally has relevance only to such normatively 
charged issues as responsibility and mens rea (broadly defined), but 
forensic pathology deals with the most concrete kind of “who, what, 
when, and where” actus reus/identity fact issues.  As to the latter, if 
the promise of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has any core 
application, it is to those kind of specific brute fact details of the 
crime and the identity of the defendant as its perpetrator.  Hence, 
the necessity of specially careful evaluation of dependability in 
regard to forensic pathology, and the inappropriateness of 
importing and applying to it loose standards appropriate, perhaps, 
in the normative issue context. 
But perhaps the distinction I have drawn between the realms of 
forensic pathology and forensic psychology is simply no longer true.  
Part of the growing concern for dependability in expertise can be 
traced to the mutation of forensic psychology beginning a couple of 
decades ago from a beast that confined itself to ultimately normative 
 
 36 On how far the normative component of such testimony normally reaches, 
see John Monahan & David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil 
Commitment, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 40 (1978). 
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issues such as sanity and capacity, to one that also attacked 
important “real fact” criminal guilt-or-innocence issues such as 
identity or the existence of the actus reus, generally through the 
medium of so called “syndrome” evidence.37   In their new area of 
operation, the old standards of dependability just aren’t good 
enough.38 
D.  Expertise on the Law, and on Inference 
  It is beyond the need for citation that, in American 
jurisprudence, the determination of the content of the law applicable 
to a case is a solely judicial function.39  No respectable taxonomy of 
expertise generated on theoretical principles would include a 
category for anything like an expert witness on “what the law is.”40  
That said, the line between “law” and “fact” is not always clear to 
judges,41 and it is not unheard of for people to be sworn as witnesses 
whose testimony is, in whole or in part, testimony concerning the 
proper construction of the law.42  The appropriate role for such a 
“witness” is at most as an amicus curiae, and if the judge feels 
colloquy would be helpful to the judge’s decision, this could as well 
be accomplished by oral argument.  Perhaps in a bench trial this 
confusion of roles is of minor import, since the judge in the process 
of decision can treat such a witness as functionally an amicus, but 
this confusion leads not uncommonly to such persons being allowed 
to testify before juries.43  For example, experts on “legal ethics” 
 
 37 A history of the development of “syndrome evidence” and its shift from 
state-of-mind to brute fact uses in criminal prosecutions is given in Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability supra note 14, at 113-19. 
 38 For an analysis of the cases dealing with syndrome evidence, see Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 14, at 119-23; for more on the cases, and the 
dependability problems of this kind of evidence in general, see chapters 7 through 
10 of MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 12. 
 39 See generally Benjamin J. Vernia, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
Regarding Questions of Domestic Law, 66 A.L.R.5th 135 (1999). But see Note, Expert 
Legal Testimony, 97 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1984) (arguing against a blanket prohibition 
of such testimony). 
 40 The sole exception might be the sui generis situation of a choice of law issue 
where the rule of decision is dependant on the construction of foreign law for 
which no normal authoritative sources of determination exist.  See, e.g., RUSSELL J. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.7 (4th ed. 2001).  
 41 Charles M. Liebson, Legal Malpractice Cases: Special Problems in Identifying 
Issues of Law and Fact and in the Use of Expert Testimony, 75 KY. L.J. 1, 20 (1986-87). 
 42 Vernia, supra note 38 (attempting a complete collection of all cases of 
admissibility and inadmissibility that might be characterized as testimony on the 
content of the law in all contexts, including jury trials).  
 43 Id.  
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regularly testify in professional malpractice cases.44  If there is a 
danger, already noted, that a normal “professional standard of care” 
witness in a malpractice case may stray from testifying about the 
empirical question of what lawyers do, to the normative question of 
what the witness believes lawyers should do, the problem of an 
“expert on legal ethics” is even worse.  Of necessity, the role of such 
a witness must frankly be either to testify to the legal obligations 
created by ethical codes and precedents, or to the witness’s own 
notions of what those obligations ought to be.  Either form of 
testimony in front of a jury improperly presents legal constructions 
as the subjects of expertise equal or superior to that of the judge, and 
often judges, having allowed such testimony, may be tempted to 
leave the choice of construction to the jury.45 
A related and compounded problem is presented by the “law 
content expert” who is not only allowed to function as an expert on 
the content of the law in front of the jury, but also to give the 
appearance of a translational expert by opining on why, in the 
particular case, this or that party was or was not in compliance with 
the law.  For instance, I know someone who regularly is called upon 
to testify in front of juries about the fiduciary duties of corporate 
boards, and then to opine about whether this particular board did, 
or did not, violate such duties.  He is aware of the theoretical 
problems of this testimony, but he believes it proper for him to give 
such testimony as long as judges allow it (we all like to be 
philosopher kings if allowed), and he likes the fees.  The conclusory 
part of his testimony is nothing more than a closing argument from 
the witness stand, (though in his case always a sincerely believed 
closing argument) and as such grossly compounds the role 
confusion already identified, and simply ought not to be allowed.46  
 
 44 See, e.g., Cohen v. Radio-Elecs. Officer’s Union, 146 N.J. 140, 679 A.2d 1188 
(1996).  
 45 See, e.g., People v. Lyons, 285 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) 
(“Allowing witnesses to testify as to questions of law invites jury confusion and the 
possibility that the jury will accept as law the witness’s conclusion rather than the 
trial judge’s instructions.”).  
 46 As Judge Learned Hand observed in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
“[a]rgument is argument whether in the box or at the bar, and its proper place is the 
last.”  45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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III.  THE TAXONOMY APPLIED—TWO ILLUSTRATIONS 
A.  An Instructive Special Case 
Lest the reader form the impression that all I do is repeat ad 
nauseam “more dependability, more dependability,”  I would like to 
recount a situation in which expertise of quite low dependability 
functions quite satisfactorily to accomplish the proper purposes of 
the law.  Earlier I used land valuation as an example of imperfectly 
normed subjective translational system.  There are many legal 
contexts, mainly in civil controversies, where the market value of 
land, or some similar non-fungible good, is an important element of 
a remedial formula.  The very nature of the concept “market value” 
in such a case is fraught with conceptual problems.  With its 
notional “willing buyer” and “willing seller” operating under 
conditions often not existing in the real world, it is a purely abstract 
concept not theoretically determined by any particular actual sale, 
even of the very land in question, since the exact amount of a 
particular sale might have been influenced by idiosyncratic factors 
not reflected in the abstract notion of market value.  Thus, market 
value is not a “fact,” even a predictive fact, in the same sense that, 
say, the result of a future election is a fact.  Nevertheless, market 
value is constructed from empirically factual knowledge.  No one 
believes that the notion of market value is totally unrelated to sales 
that have been made in markets.  Rather, the assumption is that 
comparable sales fairly close in time to the relevant time suggest a 
probable range of likely sale prices for a particular item in question.  
However, no one can say for sure what the exact market value of a 
non-fungible item like land is, and, as previously noted, those who 
study the process of predicting likely future sale value do not 
dependably agree on what constitutes comparable sales.  As a result, 
the law finds itself in a bind.  If the existence of a remedy is made to 
turn on market value, and if this inherent imprecision and 
indeterminacy is unacceptably vague, then the plaintiff (and I am 
restricting my discussion to civil cases here) will suffer a failure of 
proof in every case.  What to do?  Allow each side to call its own 
“expert,” knowing that each expert will cheat as far in favor of their 
own employer as they judge the “straight-face”47 test will allow.48  
 
 47 The test of whether you can say something with a straight face.  Also 
sometimes called the “giggle test”: Can one make the assertion without giggling? 
 48 For a recent recognition of the litigation realities in the preparation of expert 
witnesses for trial, see TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 193 F.R.D. 490 (S.D. Miss. 
2000). 
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The penalty for cheating too far is that the jury is likely to swing 
toward the number offered by the other expert.  Each expert’s 
number then will define the limits of a range.  Any number within 
the range is an acceptable remedy—truly this is a case without a 
determinate single right answer.49  Where in the range the damages 
are fixed is left to the jury’s judgment,  
 
based on its own evaluation of the persuasiveness of each expert.  In 
this case, very undependable expertise is used to forge a satisfactory 
result.50 
B.  A Less Instructive Special Case 
Another difficult special issue is causation in tort.  A complete 
consideration of causation is (blessedly) beyond the scope of this 
essay.  However, expert testimony concerning causation in products 
liability and toxic tort cases has become a subject of  particular 
controversy,  and indeed was the issue that precipitated Daubert 
itself, and Daubert’s enhanced concern for dependability of 
 
 49 This arrangement has much in common with “final offer” arbitration, also 
known as “baseball arbitration,” except that in that case the decision maker is not 
allowed to pick an intermediate number.  See, e.g., S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. ICC, 69 
F.3d 583, 585-86 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re Hopewell Int’l Ins. Ltd., 238 B.R. 25, 40-41 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
 50 It is clear that, even after Daubert, valuation experts have been subject to very 
weak reliability scrutiny.  Alan Ratliff, Kicking the Tires after Kumho: The Bottom Line 
on Admitting Financial Expert Testimony, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 432, 434 (2000).  While 
Kumho Tire could change this in some areas, especially those involving high levels 
of complexity, such as the valuation of large going concerns, at least as to real estate 
valuation in breach of sale contract and condemnation cases, the traditional laxity is 
probably a good thing, as the text suggests.  This is not to say that there are not, or 
should not be, limits to the threshold tolerance of a particular expert’s ability to 
suppress his giggle response.  For instance, in Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. 
Simmental Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 1999), somebody named Risinger (no 
relation), with the approval of the defendant registry association, had introduced 
nineteen cattle which could not be affirmatively established as genetically pure, 
including two that were shown to be “3%” genetically impure, into the American 
Simmental cattle breeding population, which numbered in excess of 138,000 
animals.  Id. at 1039.  Plaintiffs claimed that this injured the value of their own 
cattle. Id.  They showed that, after the registry of the Risinger cattle, the average 
price of such cattle dropped on both the American market, and on the Canadian 
market, but the price dropped substantially more on the American market.  Id. at 
1040.  Without considering a number of variables normally considered in livestock 
valuation, plaintiff’s damages expert attributed the entire difference in price 
between the two markets to the impurity of the American herd resulting from the 
Risinger cattle.  Id. at 1041.  Not surprisingly, the district court found that this went 
too far, and refused to let the expert testify pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
702, and the Eight Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 1040-41. 
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expertise, at least “scientific” expertise.51  Undoubtedly, “causality 
expertise” presents a special problem resulting from a number of 
factors: On the one hand, there is no shortage of credentialed 
scientists in the world who will confuse hypothesis with fact, and 
testify (and sincerely at that), to the actual existence of causal 
relations or substantially enhanced risks on weak or no evidence.52  
On the other hand, these cases are civil cases subject to a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof, a standard 
lower than would usually be required to establish the validity of a 
relationship in normal science practice.  Finally, as every first-year 
law student learns, legal causation entails normative risk allocation 
judgments which are part of the jury function.  What to do in the 
face of these colliding considerations?  Perhaps the best thing would 
be to allow the experts to testify on a dependability standard more 
consistent with the civil standard of proof than one might otherwise 
think was necessary,53 but treat the expert as a summarizational 
 
 51 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. at 579, 582-84.  There are those 
of us who see a special irony in this, since it took a risk to the pocketbook of 
corporate America to finally focus the Court’s attention on dependability issues 
which the Court showed little interest in when what was at stake was the execution 
of a criminal defendant in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
 52 This is not only not shocking, it may in fact be a byproduct of the normal 
practice of healthy science as a community enterprise, which may require a certain 
admixture of individuals irrationally committed to their own hypotheses.  Risinger 
et al., Post-Daubert World, supra note 24, at 438. 
 53 I am aware that tying the level of certainty required for admission to the 
standard of proof applicable to the material issues to which the expert’s testimony 
is directed will strike some as inappropriate.  They will argue that admissibility 
should be judged by the same standard in every case, leaving differences in 
standard of proof to be protected by a sufficiency of evidence decision once the 
record is closed.  The problem with that approach in regard to expert testimony is 
substantial, however.  It forces us to select a unitary standard of dependability 
which either lets in too much of dubious dependability on behalf of the prosecution 
in criminal cases, or which excludes too much of adequate dependability for the 
purposes of tort law.  The result of the latter situation would be too many failures 
of proof in tort, based on the easiest insufficiency judgment to make, a record 
without evidence on some essential issue like causation.  On the other hand, the 
result of a lower uniform standard would be the admission of too much of low 
dependability in criminal cases, under circumstances where the sufficiency check is 
likely to prove largely illusory.  If such expert testimony provides all or most of the 
evidence on a particular issue such as identity of the perpetrator or existence of the 
actus reus (a not uncommon situation where forensic expertise is offered by the 
prosecution), how likely is a judge to rule that the stuff he just said was dependable 
enough to be admitted is not dependable enough to support a finding?  Not likely 
enough in my judgment to depend on sufficiency alone to control the ill effects of 
such expertise on accuracy of result in criminal cases.  This would seem an especial 
concern in a world where the current reality appears to be that civil plaintiffs are 
often held to a higher standard of expert dependability than prosecutors in criminal 
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expert.  This would foreclose the expert from testifying to the 
conclusion of causation, thus requiring the presentation to be more 
in terms of educating the jury through a review of the affirmative 
evidence in the research literature, and less a matter of the witness’s 
assertion of a conclusory “opinion.” 
C.  Legal Standards of Dependability—A Few Recommendations 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow was 
revolutionary—perhaps more revolutionary than the Justices who 
fashioned it perceived.  Like many revolutionary writings, the 
Daubert opinion was in some ways naïve and incoherent, but it is 
becoming clear from this remove that it has set in motion a process 
which is transforming the rules of the expert game in litigation.  
That process is still working itself out, and, as in most periods of 
profound change, there have been both counter-revolutionary 
currents54 and excesses of misplaced zeal.55  But the decision in 
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael has reinforced the trans-substantive and 
systematic nature of the process, and fashioned an approach to 
threshold dependability which will insure that the process of change 
continues, hopefully in fruitful directions.  Kumho Tire stands for 
two important principles: First, that the gatekeeping requirement of 
minimum threshold dependability pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 applies to all proffered expert testimony, not just to the 
explicit products of science.  And second, that this threshold 
judgment must be made in regard to the particular “task at hand”, 
not globally in regard to the average dependability of a broadly 
defined discipline or area of expertise, which might be dependable 
when applied in other contexts, but not to the “task at hand.”  This 
process of  particularized “task at hand” analysis regarding the 
 
cases. See generally Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 15. 
 54 The most obvious ploy was the widespread attempt to claim that Daubert 
only applied to “scientific” evidence, and therefore to maintain the pre-Daubert 
status quo as to everything else.  Clearly Kumho Tire has explicitly made this 
approach impossible.  Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).  Another 
instinct may be seen in the almost mystical nostalgia for the days when virtually 
anything was admissible, seen in some quite respectable academics.  I will not 
name names. 
 55 Perhaps best represented by the impossibly high standards of dependability 
imposed by some courts in some tort cases.  See generally Lucinda M. Finley, 
Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary 
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (1999).  
Defendants challenging such plaintiff proffered expertise have been most 
successful under Daubert.  Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 14, at 
108, 110-12, 147.  
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dependability of all proffered expertise will characterize the next 
stage in the development of the new expert control jurisprudence.  
But it must be remembered that while Kumho Tire requires the judge 
to apply a proper standard of threshold dependability to all 
proffered expertise, at least upon an appropriately serious 
objection,56  it does not say that exactly the same threshold standard 
is applicable to every kind of expert evidence in every kind of case.  
Rather, it appears more consistent with the opinion’s emphasis on 
flexibility to conclude that proffered evidence must be shown to be 
sufficiently reliable for the task at hand, given the jury’s role and 
capacities, and the nature of the case.  Thus, I take it to be not only 
consistent with Kumho Tire, but implied by it, that evidence reliable 
enough in one legal context pursuant to rule 702 may not be reliable 
enough in another.  Consider the land valuation issue previously 
discussed.  In the normal civil case, as previously argued, a fairly lax 
threshold standard of dependability would appear to be 
appropriate, given the jury’s presumed ability to understand the 
issues involved, and the  balance of the opposing parties and their 
experts in the “baseball arbitration” dynamic of the case.  However, 
were the same issue of the value of the same land to arise in a 
criminal fraud prosecution, where, let us say, the difference between 
a felony and a misdemeanor turned on the value of the property 
being above or below a certain exact amount, I believe that the judge 
is obliged to apply a more stringent threshold standard to the 
methodology of the prosecution’s valuation expert.  While the jury 
might be warranted in relying on, or being influenced by, the 
expert’s testimony in the circumstances  of the civil case, it might 
not be so warranted in the criminal case. 
So what I believe we will see over the next decade, (when we 
look back on it)  is the working out of a task-at-hand warrant 
analysis, which asks the question: “what indices of dependability 
ought to be present to render this asserted expertise sufficiently 
dependable on this particular issue, in this kind of case, so that a 
jury would be warranted in relying on, or being influenced by it?”  
 
 56 Kumho Tire leaves open the issue of the “price of admission” burden on the 
opponent of expertise, distinguishing between “ordinary” cases, where sufficient 
dependability “is properly taken for granted,” and “less usual [and] more complex 
cases where cause for questioning the expert’s reliability arises.”  526 U.S. at 152-53.  
Clearly what is envisioned is something more weighty than a conclusory or pro 
forma objection, and one criticism that might be leveled at the criminal defense bar 
as a group may be that in the press of time, they have not properly come to grips 
with what is necessary for an effective Daubert/Kumho challenge.  Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 14, at 137-45. 
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Some recent scholarship has already headed generally in this 
direction,57 and it is in the working out of this “task at hand” 
warrant analysis that I believe a new taxonomy of expertise will not 
only be helpful, but essential. 
So what variables have we seen from our preliminary 
taxonomic exercise that affect the dependability we should demand 
of tendered expertise, and what statements does it seem tentatively 
appropriate to make about them?58  The following is a non-exclusive 
and incomplete list: 
§ “Everyday” summarizational expertise is easily understood 
by the jury and its dependability can be left to their 
evaluation, though care must be taken so that such a witness 
is not allowed to wander into translational expertise. 
§ Dependability of technical summarizational expertise should 
be judged by standards applicable to translational expertise 
in the same context. 
§ Translational expertise with a high clinical subjectivity 
component should be approached cautiously, especially 
 
 57 See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 
107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998); Note, Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence of 
Hard Science, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1467 (2000).  The theory of warrants for assertion or 
belief is associated with the Pragmatists, most particularly, John Dewey, (though 
Professor Brewer displays a partiality for C.S. Peirce).  H.S. Thayer, Pragmatism. in 6 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).  The conclusion of 
Professor Brewer’s article (after a fascinating 149 pages) that ordinarily non-
scientist judges and juries can never be warranted in evaluating (choosing between) 
the claims of disagreeing scientists seems a bit extreme to me.  The Harvard note 
bites off a smaller piece, but persuasively argues that in at least a class of cases 
involving issues of “strong scientific uncertainty” (where many experimental 
scientists claim no answer to a legally pertinent question has been dependably 
derived, and clinicians claim an answer can be properly inferred), there are warrant 
guidelines for choosing between “generic toxic tort” rules and “slip and fall” rules. 
Note, supra at 1470-71.  Another useful approach to the warrant problem, sub nom 
the “better evidence principle” will be found in David L. Faigman, et al., How Good 
is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
645 (2000). 
 58 Lists of “factors” for judges to consider abound.  Daubert itself had one, and 
so does the Advisory Committee note to revised Rule 702.  I have endeavored to 
include only observations that have grown out of the taxonomic exercise in this 
article, not every important consideration in the evaluation of threshold 
dependability.  For instance, I believe one of the most pervasive phenomena 
undermining dependability of forensic expertise is the presence of expectancy 
effects, and that this must be taken into consideration in any approach to threshold 
dependability.  See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and 
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 21, 64-65 (1996).  However, this important issue did not arise in the body of 
the essay, and is therefore not on the list, and is held for another day. 
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where real world practice does not provide unambiguous 
feedback concerning the correctness of the conclusions 
reached.  Generally there ought to be strong external 
evidence of dependability in such cases, through well 
designed tests showing individual proficiency, or at least 
group error rates, in regard to the particular task at hand. 
§ Translational expertise offered on normative issues can 
perhaps be safely allowed on a lower standard of certifiable 
dependability than should be required of “brute fact” or 
“pure fact” issues such as actus reus and identity, in the same 
litigation context.  The same is true in regard to magnitude 
judgment or  theoretical “no one right answer” issues such 
as market value. 
§ All things being equal, the higher the standard of proof 
applicable to the issue upon which the expertise is offered, 
the higher the required threshold dependability should be. 
§ High standards should apply to pure fact issues, and 
extremely high standards to prosecution expertise bearing 
on pure fact issues in criminal cases, such as identity or the 
existence of the actus reus. 
§ Courts should be careful, especially in jury cases, to prevent 
an expert from testifying to a construction of the law.  
Further, the court should prevent expert “opinion” which 
might be fair forensic argument, but should clearly be 
presented only as such by counsel in closing. 
§ Courts should be careful not to apply to expertise in general, 
standards of dependability appropriate only to a limited 
context. 
I make no claim that this list is complete, nor indeed that any 
given statement may not properly be subject to substantial 
qualification on further reflection and analysis.  Nor do I assert that 
the taxonomic exercise upon which it is based is yet close to being 
completely worked out.  However, I do believe that we cannot 
finally come to grips with the problems of expert testimony and its 
control in the courtroom except in the light of some such attempt to 
identify the varying functions and contexts of what we globally 
label “expertise.” 
 
